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Following the desegregation decisions of the U.S.
Supreme Court in 1954, most southern cities began to
experience the emergence of new patterns of black leader¬
ship. These patterns actually became visible during and
following the sit-in movements of the early 1960's. Prior
to this time, leadership among blacks was generally char¬
acterized as "conservative" and/or "accomodating" and "com¬
promising." However, the new patterns which evolved utilized
a direct action approach to leadership, which pressed demands
for social change beneficial to the entire black community.
With the preceding in mind, I shall attempt to ana¬
lyze the changing patterns of leadership in the black: com¬
munity of Atlanta, Georgia during the 1960's.
Review of Literature.—Within the past two decades,
much attention has been devoted by social scientists to the
identification and analysis of leadership in black communi¬
ties. In doing so, they have attempted to help us understand
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the leadership roles in the black community; they have at¬
tempted to make a comparative analysis of black leadership
and the larger white leadership; and they have attempted to
explain why leadership takes the form it does in black com¬
munities .
The purpose of this section is to review the liter¬
ature which is relative to the study of leadership patterns
in black communities. While the following represent only a
few of the studies done, it is felt that their contributions
are significant.
Floyd Hunter's study of "Regional City" (Atlanta,
Georgia )^, was a pioneering effort in the study of com¬
munity power and leadership because it initiated the reputa¬
tional method of identifying community leaders and at the
same time studied the black community leadership in Atlanta.
Hunter first compiled a list of leaders from names
submitted by major community organizations and civil leaders.
Fourteen judges were then asked to identify the top ten
leaders in four areas: community affairs, government, busi¬
ness, and social affairs. The leaders thus identified were
then interviewed in order to discover the patterns of asso¬
ciation and influence that existed in Atlanta. This method
^Floyd Hunter, Community Power Structure (Chapel
Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1953).
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was followed in both the black and white cornmionities.
Hunter found a leadership-decision-making structure
in the black community that was remarkably similar in form
to that of the white community: a group of "top" decision¬
makers who make decisions for the black community. The
black leadership structure tended to be exclusive, as was
the white leadership structure. Hunter did find, however,
significant differences between the occupants of leadership
positions in the black community and similar positions in
the white community. He found that the occupational listings
of black leaders differed greatly from that of the white
leaders. The former was comprised of professionals, while
the latter was dominated by persons from commerce and in¬
dustry.
Hunter concluded that the black leadership was bas¬
ically a stable one, and that its "real" power (the ability
to move goods and services) was strictly limited. The
stability of black leadership was seen as a "functional ne¬
cessity for the leaders of the community at large, and con¬
sequently, through the channels described a relationship does
exist between the total community and the sub-community.
Hunter's definition of power as "the ability to move
^Ibid., p. 143.
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goods and services toward defined goals” is biased toward
the study of institutionalized power of a commercial and
industrial type with political power seen as a secondary
type. This leads Hunter to the mistaken notion that with¬
out such institutionalized centers of power, the black
comm;anity leadership must be inherently "weaker" than that
of the larger community, and that the goals of the black
sub-community are only of marginal importanfee to the total
community. This projection of majority values upon the
black community leads to an underestimation of the resources
which black leaders and people can bring about, especially
when they insist that their objectives be seen as part of
the total community.
Also, Hunter's definition of power and leadership is
biased toward stable forms of leadership. The majority of
leaders that he found in the white community, especially the
top leaders, were persons who had significant institutional
bases of support, or private sources of wealth and income.
The absence of such persons in the black leadership group
did not cause Hunter to ask whether "stability" is a useful
concept in studying black leadership. Instead, he imputed
stability to the black leadership group by relating it to
the functional needs of the larger white community. Sta¬
bility of leadership patterns are not necessarily crucial in
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the black community, particularly if the goals and objec¬
tives of the black coinmunity do not value it highly.
Ten years later, Atlanta was studied by M. Kent
Jennings.^ This study was prompted by Hunter's, however,
Jennings' conclusions were far different, particularly those
concerning black leadership.
Jennings' primary objective was to examine the
relationship between a person's political status and his
political roles in community leadership. He divided leader¬
ship roles into three different categories: attributed
influentials, prescribed influentials, and economic domi¬
nants. His research was particularly concerned with the
attributed influentials because these were the reputed
leadership of the commvinity. He first held forty explor¬
atory interviews with persons located in positions of
prominence. Next, nominations were made by twenty key
informants of those they considered to be the most influ¬
ential in the community.
Jennings found a series of elites in Atlanta, and
the black leaders were equal, not subordinate partners in a
political coalition that ran Atlanta. He also felt that it
is easiest for blacks to gain high political status on the
^M. Kent Jennings, Community Influentials: The
Elites of Atlanta (Glencoe: The Free Press, 1964).
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strength of their leadership in strong organizations and
institutions.
The research for this study was done prior to the
sit-in movement in Atlanta, and Jennings does admit that the
movement had a profound effect on leadership in the black
community, as well as the community at large. Significantly,
though, Jennings found leadership in Atlanta more diver¬
sified than that described by Hunter.
Lewis M. Killian and Charles U. Smith^ studied Tal¬
lahassee, Florida, as a city in which a change in the pattern
of black leadership seemed to accompany a crisis in race
relations. This study was done shortly after the bus boy¬
cotts which occurred in the city. Their purpose was to find
whether the leadership during the bus boycotts was new to
the black community as well as to the white community; and
whether they had actually displaced the old group of leaders
or was the community split between two groups of leaders.
The structure of the black leadership was assessed
through interviews with a panel of twenty-one blacks desig¬
nated as leaders by social scientists familiar with the
community. A panel of twenty-one white leaders was also
^Lewis M. Killian and Charles U. Smith, "Negro Pro¬
test Leaders in a Southern Community," Social Forces, 38
(March, 1960), 253-7.
interviewed. These leaders had dealt with the black com¬
munity in either an official capacity or unofficial one
during the bus protest. They also often spoke to the black
community in behalf of the white community. All of the
subjects were asked a series of questions about black leader¬
ship before and after the bus boycotts.
A survey of the adult black population was also made
to determine their attitudes toward segregation in general,
the bus boycott, and the leadership of the bus protest move¬
ment and that following it. The responses to questions
executed here were placed on a Likert-type scale.
Killian and Smith found that the black leaders felt
that a real change in leadership had taken place between the
Pre-Boycott and Post-Boycott periods. Although accomodating
leaders were replaced by protest leaders, the new (protest)
leaders were not seen by other prominent blacks (the old
accomodating leaders) as "compromising" leaders (those able
to deal most effectively with whites in the Post-Boycott
period). The panel of white leaders perceived black leader¬
ship in the same way as the black leaders; and they were not
willing to deal with the new leaders because of their uncom¬
promising attitude toward segregation. The black community
considered the new leaders as their leaders and supported
them, while no longer supporting the old leaders. They were
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in favor of the bus protest movement. The black community
also felt that the new leaders would be able to maintain
their positions of leadership.
Killian and Smith felt that the new black leadership
would be a stable and permanent one even though their efforts
in the bus protest failed. This was evidenced by the fact
that the new leadership is more militant; it seeks gains for
the black community through formal demands and requests,
boycotts, lawsuits, and voting.
This study differs from Hunter's in many ways. One
reason is because of the period of time when the two studies
were done. Hunter's was done before the U.S. Supreme Court
decisions on desegregation. The data gathering methods
differed in attempting to assess black leadership; then, too,
Killian and Smith studied one phase of leadership—that
during a "crisis" situation. However, Killian and Smith did
concur that the leaders during the crisis situation were con¬
sidered by the black community as their leaders in any sit¬
uation. It is also significant to note that Killian and
Smith did not relate the social characteristics of the lea¬
ders studied. Apparently, they did not feel this to be an
important factor in studying leadership. They also included
the attitudes of the black community in their study; in most
studies of leadership, the community which the leaders serve
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is completely ignored. The black community is often appre¬
hensive about participating in research studies, because they
feel that they gain nothing from them.
Black leadership in Little Rock, Arkansas during the
school desegregation crisis was the siabject of a study done
by Tilman C. Cothran and William Phillips, Jr.^
Research methods were employed that were similar to
those used by Floyd Hunter. Major emphasis was placed on
the social characteristics of leaders during that period,
including occupation, age, education, religious affiliation,
etc. Leadership typologies were also delegated; protest
leaders and accomodating leaders. An assessment of black
leadership was made by the black leaders in the community.
Cothran and Phillips found that ministers were sig¬
nificant leaders in the black commvuiity while businessmen
dominated the white community. They also found that persons
characterized as protest leaders were more involved in the
desegregation crisis than were the accomodating leaders.
Although accomodating leaders didn't play forward roles
during the crisis, there was a general unity among all of
the black leaders because their goals were the same. There
^Tilman C. Cothran and William Phillips, Jr., "Negro
Leadership in a Crisis Situation," Phylon; The Atlanta Uni¬
versity Review of Race and Culture, XXII (Summer, 1961),
107-18.
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was little contact between white leaders and black leaders
during this time. This is probably because the white leader-^
ship in Little Rock deals primarily with accomodating black
leaders. Since protest leaders were in the forefront at
this time, the white leadership rejected any attempt at
interracial communication.
Although the attitudes of the black community toward
their leaders were not studied in depth, Cothran and Phillips
felt that the protest leaders gain their prestige and status
through acceptance by the black community.
Leading Ideas.—This study is descriptive in nature,
and it will attempt to show that a change in the patterns of
leadership in the black community of Atlanta, Georgia, did
occur during the 1960's, primarily as a result of the sit-in
movements during 1960 and 1961. Sub-hypotheses which I will
examine are that leadership in the black community: (1) may
change its pattern as a result of social change; (2) is more
a function of the pecularities of the situation rather than
the kind of reputation one has; (3) is most demanding, re¬
quiring continuous presence, personal participation, dialogue
and face-to-face interaction rather than indirect communi¬
cation and acting through representatives; (4) is based more
on immediate accomplishments than past performances; and
(5) is distributed among people of a wide variety of social
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and economic circumstances and is not limited to a pres¬
tigious elite of high socio-economic status.
With these thoughts in mind, the major concepts used
will refer to the different types of leadership generally
found in black communities. Oliver C. Cox has designated
five different types, however, three of them will be used in
this analysis: conservative, compromise, and direct-action
(protest).^
The conservative leader is one who has already estab¬
lished himself as a leader among his people, and is able to
exploit his power in the interest of the power structure.
He is not an enemy of his people; he merely dictates that a
given situation is expedient to avoid the common cause and
make peace with the power structure. He identifies the power
structure as the best friend of the people and serves as a
principal intermediary in securing advantages from this
"friend" that will apparently outweigh those which may be
secured by the people through their insistence upon ends
embodied in their common cause.
The compromise leader is one who has become wedged
in between protests and conservatism. His fundamental atti-
^Oliver C. Cox, "Leadership Among Negroes in the
United States," in Studies in Leadership, ed. by Alvin W,
Gouldner (New York: Harper and Row Publishers, 1950),
pp. 228-71.
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tudes are protest attitudes; yet because of his dependent
relationship to the power structure, he has to act as if he
was sympathetic with its interests. In essence he clings to
principles, but submits to the power structure for a price.
On the other hand, the protest (referred to in this
study as direct action) leader employs protest as its main
line of action and seeks to influence public opinion in this
way. As a result, effective political pressure in favor of
civil rights for blacks would be brought to bear upon the
power structure. It is also characterized by bringing about
collective organization and may include mobilization of the
entire black community.
Techniques and Tools.—This study was carried on
almost completely by a socio-historical analysis of leader¬
ship in the black community primarily during the sit-in
movements of 1960 and 1961. An identification of signifi¬
cant events, conflicts, crises, etc., in the black community
was made and includes a description of these events and an
assessment of their outcome.
The persons involved in these activities were also
determined, as well as their social attributes and how they
became involved. Generally, these persons are black leaders.
Their differences were rated and a comparative analysis was
made in the characteristics of leaders associated with
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different kinds of events, conflicts, and crises that were
significant to the black community.
This method of analysis is most important because
Atlanta has been characterized by different patterns of
black leadership during a given period of time. Most black
leaders have been recognized and acknowledged by the black
community during crisis situations, therefore, it will be
worthwhile to see the techniques they tend to develop in
leading the community.
Types of data.—The socio-historical analysis drew
upon existing documents and also involved original research,
including interviews with twelve persons directly or peri¬
pherally involved in the events which occurred. The enxamer-
ation of outstanding events and crises during the movement
and following it, required researching back editions of news¬
papers and magazines. The determination of who was involved
and what each person did was derived from the various docu¬
ments and from the twelve interviews which were of the open-
ended type.
Theoretical orientation.—The major thesis of this
study is social change, as it has affected leadership in the
black community in Atlanta.
Until recently, theories of social change described
it as if it were inevitable and not under man's control—a
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simple movement from past to future. However, a different
orientation is now beginning to emerge which sees social
change as a consequence of man's actions, and therefore under
his control. Because of this orientation, new theories have
developed and are termed, "theories of directed social
change.
In his book. Resources for Social Change, James Cole¬
man has drawn together some of these new theories and applied
them to particular problems of blacks in the United States
including their social, economic, and political positions.
These theories are presented as possible ways black people
may use the required knowledge as an aid to social policy at
all levels of social action.
Since this study is concerned with the political
power of blacks, Coleman's theories will be incorporated
therein. The sit-in movements can be seen as a form of di¬
rected social change which has increased the amount of poli¬
tical power among blacks. As a result, this has decreased
the "deficit of black freedom of action among them."^ Cole¬
man uses the phrase "freedom of (social) action" to mean
^James S. Coleman, Resources for Social Change: Race





social integration, civil rights, and other similar terms.
He uses this phrase because, "it expresses the essential
attributes of which the Negro, as a Negro, has been deprived
in American society."^
Because blacks are becoming increasingly aware of
the resources available to them to effect social change.
Coleman further theorizes that leadership among blacks is
dependent upon this change. Leaders utilize different methods
and techniques in leading the community, depending on the
situation. These methods include the utilization of direct
action and electoral assets, including legal and legislative
resources. These methods are now being used extensively by
black leaders.
This thesis attempts to follow the recent trend of
directed social change, by utilizing the theories that Cole¬
man has presented, particularly in the final analysis.
^Ibid., p. 7.
CHAPTER II
PATTERNS OF LEADERSHIP IN THE
CIVIL RIGHTS MOVEMENT
Atlanta is considered the foremost city in the Deep
South partly because of its progressive view toward race
relations. Because of the shrewdness of its businessmen who
wished to maintain good fortune for the city, Atlanta ap¬
peared racially moderate in order to contrast itself with
other Southern cities, and as a result, to attract more busi¬
ness. This meant that Atlanta has experienced an external
pressure to develop at least the image of racial moderation,
and to the degree that a successful image must have a sub¬
stantive base, Atlanta has made racial progress earlier than
most other cities.
An internal pressure has also made that progress both
necessary and possible. Black voting in Georgia started in
1946 with the end of the white primary in the Primus King
case.^ A massive voter registration campaign was staged in
^Clarence A. Bacote, "The Negro in Atlanta Politics,"
Phylon; The Atlanta University Review of Race and Culture,
XVI (Fourth Quarter, 1955), 345.
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the black community and was spearheaded by the All Citizens
Registration Committee and the Atlanta Urban League. By
May, 1947, when the campaign officially closed, there were
24,137 blacks on the registration books in Fulton County, of
whom 21,244 lived in Atlanta.^
Leadership before 1960: conservative and compro¬
mising.—Careful organization and planning was required to
keep this new group of voters together. In 1949, the black
Democrats, headed by a leading black attorney, and the black
Republicans, headed by a retired railroad mail clerk and
civic leader, joined hands and formed the Atlanta Negro
Voters League. This bipartisan group worked primarily in
local elections as a unit behind the most desirable candi¬
dates in the Democratic primary. The League maintained a
balance between Republicans and Democrats and in addition to
the lawyer and civic leader who served as co-chairmen, the
group included two ministers, a leader of the Atlanta Urban
League, the publisher of the Atlanta Daily World, the presi¬
dent of Atlanta University, the Executive Secretary of the
YMCA, and a well known businessman.
The mayor of Atlanta bargained mainly with this
group; he advised them regularly on the acceptability of each
^Ibid., p. 348.
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candidate running for office.^ The League would then debate
and decide whether to endorse. Once they reached a decision,
they distributed endorsement cards throughout the black com¬
munity. The black voters, for the most part, voted the
recommended slate 100 percent, thus creating a bloc vote in
the black community.
The League also worked at tackling other problems in
the city. There were very rigid segregation laws and prac¬
tices, white brutality and a general feeling that Negroes
had to stay in their places. In trying to bring about change
they realized that their job would be hard because they had
not endorsed many liberals in the elections. Because there
were not many, they would endorse the lesser of the two evils.
They did get black police officers and a few segregation laws
off the books.
The Negro Voters League was the spokesman for the
black community without challenge. They were criticized by
certain elements in the white community for giving blacks a
bloc vote, but this is what gave them power to receive favor¬
able response from City Hall. One person interviewed stated:
The most important thing the Negro Voters League
did was to bring unity to the black community.
^Harry Holloway, The Politics of the Southern Negro
(New York: Random House, Inc., 1969), pp. 198-9.
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There was little contact between blacks and whites.
The mayor spoke with members of the Voters League. . .
they kept things straight and quiet in the black
commxanity.
Unmistakably, the leaders of the black community were
members of the black upper class. Of the many black leaders,
none had clear ties to the black masses. In some ways the
ministers had potentially the greatest access to the commu¬
nity through their congregations. On the other hand, the
black businessmen exerted a pervasive control over the black
community. Of the primary political coalition of black lea¬
ders, all were officers of the three major black business
institutions in Atlanta: Citizens Trust Company, Atlanta
Life Insurance Company, and the Mutual Federal Savings and
Loan Association. These men were also on the Board of Di¬
rectors of the major churches, the local NAACP office, and
the black YMCA where political discussions were held.
The result of this pattern was that any civil rights
activity engaged in by these men was essentially elitist and
conservative in nature and contributed little to the improve¬
ment of the conditions endured by large nvunbers of impover¬
ished blacks in Atlanta. One of the leaders of the sit-in
movement made the following comment:
These black leaders knew they had succeeded in a
segregated society, but realized the inherent am¬
bivalence of their success. Therefore, even
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though the 1960 civil rights movement chal¬
lenged the basis of their success, they knew
that a change must come.
To some degree, a newer type of leadership was ap¬
proached in Atlanta in 1957 with the desegregation of the
Atlanta buses. The resolution of this issue refined the
Atlanta way of handling racial crises and developed a half¬
way model somewhere between indirect court action and nego¬
tiation and direct action.
In one sense, the desegregation of the buses in
Atlanta should have forewarned Atlanta's black and white
leaders of what would come. While this series of events
prescribed a half-way model for the solution of racial dis¬
putes in Atlanta, it also revealed the new forces pressing
for more direct action leadership.
In June, 1957, black and white leaders and the pres¬
ident of the Atlanta Transit Company, worked out elaborate
plans for a test of the Georgia bus segregation laws. The
mayor wished to delay the test, but the black leaders, xinder
pressure from a group of students and young professionals,
and from Martin Luther King's Montgomery boycott, insisted
on immediate implementation. One of the leading black min¬
ister's of the city, led several other ministers in boarding
a bus at a pre-arranged time. The Chief of Police imme¬
diately arrested and booked them.
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Two court tests ensued from the arrests challenging
the seating laws violated due process; one filed by the min¬
ister who led the demonstrations, in state court, and another
by the president of the local NAACP (also a minister), in
federal court.
These incidents formed a precedent for later activity
in both the white and black leaders' minds. The pattern was
established: a single activity, usually a demonstration,
followed by court testing procedures, a cessation of further
activity, and a return to segregation lantil the case was
decided. This half-way model, a compromise between direct
and indirect action was accepted by both communities. In
the early phase of the sit-ins, this was the type of model
both sides sought to follow.
The bus desegregation had other effects. It demon¬
strated potential factional splits in the leadership of the
black community. The president of the NAACP was not a vet¬
eran of the earlier 1950's Atlanta activities. His election
to the presidency signified increased "militancy" for that
organization. The rivalry between he and the other minister
had the effect of pushing both factions toward stronger
actions of greater appeal and benefit for the black community.
These events also took place without the active participation
of the officials of Atlanta University. It is evident that
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these developments represented some changes in the make-up
of the black community's leadership coalition.
The first phase; compromising leadership.—Adherence
to the 1957 bus desegregation model characterized the first
phase of the Atlanta sit-in movement, from February, 1960,
through the summer.
After the Greensboro sit-ins, few in Atlanta felt
that the city would escape the sit-in movement. Both the
black and white coramxxnities reacted almost immediately. The
reaction in the adult black community was mixed, but favor¬
able.
On February 5th, three Morehouse college students
met to discuss the role their school should play in the new
movement. After enlisting the help of other students in the
Atlanta University Complex, they formed a steering committee
of three representatives from each college. The leaders of
the group visited the president of Morehouse College to in¬
form him of their intentions. He told them to go ahead, and
emphasized that the presidents of the six institutions sup¬
ported the students and he personally, "would have been
dismayed had they not participated in this Southwide revo¬
lution."^ However, an ex-student leader mentioned that:
^Benjamin E. Mays, Born to Rebel (New York: Charles
Scribner's Sons, 1971), p. 288.
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The university complex was split over support for
the students. While no direct pressure was ex¬
erted, the presidents continually reminded the
students that their central purpose was education.
On February 20th, the student steering committee met
with the Council of Presidents of the Atlanta University
Complex and agreed to continue these informational sessions
twice a week. The continual meetings with the black admin¬
istrators had their effects. Around March 1st, the president
of Spelman College suggested that the students preceed their
protests with a statement of grievances.^ The students then
formed a committee to draw up a manifesto for the Atlanta
community.
This tactic had been foreshadowed in January by a
group of young black professionals. The Atlanta Committee
for Cooperative Action (ACCA), who produced a booklet, "A
Second Look, the Negro Citizen in Atlanta," which described
the aberrations from Atlanta's image of moderate race rela¬
tions.^ This committee in a sense represented the burgeoning
new generation of leadership within the black political coa¬
lition, as they were professional businessmen and educators.
They felt that for the most part, the older black leadership
Ijbid., p. 288.
^The Atlanta Committee for Cooperative Action, A Sec¬
ond Look, the Negro Citizen in Atlanta (Atlanta: The
Atlanta Committee for Cooperative Action, 1960).
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was moving too slow and things needed to be accomplished now.
However, ACCA was not being accepted by the black people as
their leaders at this time. The students admired and res¬
pected the members of this group, as their manifesto re¬
flected the ACCA lead, but appeared in a much more dramatic
fashion.
The student committee called itself the Committee on
Appeal for Human Rights (CQAHR) following the title of their
manifesto placed in the Atlanta Daily World, Constitution,
and Journal, on March 9th, "An Appeal for Human Rights." It
stated the students' support of the other sit-in protests,
citing the slow pace of racial progress as particularly gal¬
ling. The students listed the areas of inequity and injus¬
tice in Atlanta and Georgia which they intended to remedy:
education, jobs, housing, voting, law-enforcement, hospitals,
and public facilities.
The President of both Atlanta University and the
Council of Presidents acted as an agent and placed the ad in
the papers. He had succeeded in channeling the first acti¬
vity away from a sit-in.
Reactions to the ad revealed surprise, but also sup¬
port. The president of the NAACP applauded it, but had not
been informed in advance, nor had any of the other adult
black leaders.
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The white community also heralded the ad. Because
of it, they felt the sit-ins would not occur in Atlanta.
Although the Appeal was a scathing commentary on the real
conditions in Atlanta and tarnished its image, whites had an
ambivalent reaction: they were glad to escape street demon¬
strations, but were apprehensive of what the Appeal meant.
For the black community, the Appeal was very much a
joint effort between young and old. It was emphasized by an
ex-student leader that "it drew on the Urban League, the
NAACP, the ACCA, and the Atlanta Council on H\aman Relations."
The solid support of the black community benefited the stu¬
dents; cooperation insured the older members of the black
coalition some influence over the students. It represented
a good compromise between direct and indirect action.
What the college presidents and other black leaders
did not know was that on March 15th, a sit-in demonstration
would be conducted at ten downtown public lunch counters.
Over 200 students, under the direction of COAHR attempted to
get food service at the public transportation terminals, at
state, city, and county office buildings, and at cafeterias
in federal office buildings. These particular places were
selected because they were federally tax-supported or they
were places where the interstate commerce clause of the Con¬
stitution gave the federal courts jurisdiction. Seventy-
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seven students were arrested.^
All of Atlanta was shaken up and surprised that the
students had staged a sit-in. White politicians started
calling the members of the Negro Voters League in an attempt
to find out what was going on; however, the League did not
know and could not help them. iThe League did try to reason
with the students to wait and let them negotiate a settle¬
ment with the white leaders. However, the students would not
listen and this gave the ACCA a chance to move into the fore¬
front. ACCA furnished lawyers for the students and gave them
support in their efforts; even to the extent that when the
Daily World denounced the students for acting without sound
guidance, they organized a newspaper of their own, T^e In¬
quirer, a few months later.
The presidents of the six colleges attempted to open
negotiations with downtown businessmen suggesting to them and
urging them to use their influence to get the eating places
opened to blacks without the need of further demonstrations.
They received firm rebuffs.^
A commemoration march was held on May 17th, signify¬
ing the seventh anniversary of the 1954 school decisions.
^Lonnie King, "Let Freedom Ring," Atlanta inquirer,
September 12, 1960, p. 4.
2
Mays, op. cit., p. 291.
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The march was peaceful and orderly, and no arrests were
made.
The black community reflected both a continued at¬
tempt to maintain unity and emerging political splits. The
chairman of COAHR asked an older leader (a minister) to form
and direct a Student-Adult Liason Committee. The Committee's
function was to raise money, arrange community meetings, and
coordinate demonstration logistics, and obtain adult marchers
whenever possible. The Committee ran an advertisement (in
the Constitution on May 30th), which was signed by twelve
black organizations comprised mostly of businessmen (who had
provided bail money), ministers, and civil rights organi¬
zations. ^ Its purpose was to show that the adult blacks,
particularly those who might be classed as well off, sup¬
ported the students' actions.
The significant omissions were those signatures of
any of the Atlanta University Center personnel, of the edi¬
tor of the Daily World, and of the head of the black YMCA.
This division in the black community would become more
marked with time, as the influence of the members of the
original black political coalition declined and the black
leadership became more diversified.
^"An Endorsement in Support of Human Dignity,
Atlanta Constitution, May 30, 1960, p. 20.
II
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After the May 17th march, student activity subsided
somewhat and the universities closed for the summer and
there were not sufficient people for major marches. Several
college students picketed the largest downtown department
store on June 26th, but brief negotiations between the store
owners and some black adult leaders failed.
On October 19th, the sit-ins resumed at each Ixinch
counter in the largest department store in the city as well
as other variety and department stores. Thirty-five persons
were arrested at the largest department store. They refused
to leave, wishing to invoke arrest to implement their "jail-
no-bail" tactic. Seventeen persons at the other stores were
also arrested.
The next day, pickets and sit-ins took place at train
stations as well as downtown stores. More people were ar¬
rested and sentenced to ten days at the city prison farm.
The lunch counters closed down, but demonstrations continued.
On October 22nd, the mayor announced that he had
contacted leaders on both sides, and requested a sixty to
ninety day truce, while negotiations were worked out. He
met with a group gathered by three members of the Negro
Voters League and they agreed to a thirty day truce. The
students denied that they had been contacted, but since the
leaders of COAHR were in jail, the acting chairman ( a young
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minister) accepted the truce. The mayor then used his power
of pardon to release the students on their signatures and
indicated he would contact merchants and state and county
officials to have all charges dropped. He asked the fore¬
most black attorney and a black minister to mediate in the
black community.
The negotiations during the truce occurred essen¬
tially between two committees with the mayor traveling back
and forth between the students and black adults, and the
downtown merchants. This was the old method of compromise,
but it failed because of an unwillingness to compromise on
the part of both blacks and whites. The mayor then asked
for an extension of the truce. The students first agreed
to an extension, but later decided to cancel the agreement.
One reason the negotiations failed may have been the
merchants attempt to divide and conquer the black leadership.
The owner and the chairman of the board of the largest down¬
town department store met with four members of the Negro
Voters League. The merchants were accustomed to thinking
these men the leaders of the black community, as they were
in "the old days." The meeting was cancelled, however, as
the press found out about it.
At this point, there had been sporadic, visible, well-
organized protests; interrupted by weeks of behind the scenes
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attempts at negotiations and compromise. Several old black
leaders were beginning to be bypassed. On the other hand,
the students protested things older blacks had always known
were wrong; some of the older black leaders were willing to
follow the students both out of moral sympathy and in an
attempt to maintain some of their previous control over the
black community.
The emergence of direct-action leadership.—On
November 25th, the sit-ins and picketing resumed. Increas¬
ingly, the adult black community became involved and sup¬
ported the new demonstrations; some participated. The
demonstrations and sit-ins continued through Christmas.
The stores laid off 400 to 600 black lunch room employees.
This constituted a strong counter-pressure on the movement.
On January 8th, the Federal Reserve Bank announced
that department store sales were down ten percent in Metro¬
politan Atlanta and thirteen percent in downtown Atlanta as
compared with the previous year.^
The Student-Adult Liason Committee invited repre¬
sentatives of the Chamber of Commerce, the Junior Chamber,
and the Atlanta Merchants Retail Association, to meet with
^John Petroff, "The Effects of Student Boycotts Upon
the Purchasing Power of Negro Families in Atlanta, Georgia,"
Phylon; The Atlanta University Review of Race and Culture,
XXIV (Fall, 1963),266-7.
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representatives of COAHR and the Committee in an "explora¬
tory conference on the issue involved in our selective
buying campaign."^ All groups turned the Committee's offer
down. The president of the Chamber of Commerce remarked#
"Negro students. . . don't necessarily represent a majority
of the Negro population or the leaders of the Negro com¬
munity. "2 By this time, the students fully realized that
their power lay in the boycott and in continued visible
pressure.
By February 7th, students mounted what became the
final blow at arriving at some settlement; two weeks of
sit-ins, demonstrations, and arrests. Obeying an oath to
adhere to non-violence and to remain in jail without post¬
ing bond, over eighty students filled the Atlanta jails.
The chairman and co-chairman of COAHR were arrested the first
day but they posted bond so that they might direct the action
which lasted until February 20th. A group of black doctors
as well as several ministers were arrested while participat¬
ing, during the same period.
On February 15th, there was a mass meeting of 1600
^"Sit-in Camp Asks New Negotiations," Atlanta Con¬
stitution, December 13, 1960, p. 4.
2"Allen, Ross Hit Maddox Racial Plan," Atlanta Con¬
stitution. Deceiriber 12, 1960, p. 6.
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persons at a black church, of which the crowd was sixty per¬
cent adults, to demonstrate support for the jailed students.
The students finally left the jails on February 23rd,
after a petition was received from the black adults of
Atlanta asking them to come out and pledging all out sup¬
port for the "duration of the movement."^
Negotiations were progressing by this time, and the
students believed that they had achieved their purposes of
opposition to segregation and the rallying of older black
support.
One of the chairmen of the Negro Voters League
reopened negotiations by request of the students. He
arranged bi-weekly meetings with about twenty-five black
leaders, including old leaders, young businessmen, and stu¬
dents; and white leaders, which lasted three to four hours
each. These were the first face-to-face meetings with whites.
The negotiations were far from easy and they affected
some of the perceptions each community had about each other.
The white leaders reasoned that if school desegregation went
smoothly, then lunch-counter desegregation would also, and
they insisted on tying these two together. The black, leaders
insisted that the lunch counters be desegregated and that the
^"Students Leave Jail, Adults: We'll Back You,
Atlanta Inquirer, February 25, 1961, p. 1.
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laid-off blacks be re-hired. Eventually, the re-hiring was
traded for delayed desegregation.
By February 23rd, when the last students left jail,
the negotiations were probably reached: an end to the boy¬
cotts, sit-ins and picketing; reopening of the lunch counters
on a segregated basis; then desegregation of the lunch
counters sometime after school desegregation, but before
October 15, 1961; and the re-hiring of as many black em¬
ployees as possible. A few details remained. Each group
had to report back to the Chamber of Commerce and the black
community.
By March 7th, the Chamber had released a statement,
which one of the black leaders (the president of Atlanta
University) had written, and another (a leading attorney)
took to the newspapers. He acted as messenger to indicate
the black community's support. Both parties felt that the
relationship which had existed between the races for a long
n\imber of years should be reinstated in Atlanta in every way
possible.
This statement met with enthusiastic response from
the mayor and the white press. For white Atlanta, the set¬
tlement was both classic and real. Blacks and whites did
meet together directly rather than working through the mayor,
and a larger proportion of the black community was represented
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through the young blacks present. It reestablished the
coalition pattern on a broader base and with a new recog¬
nition of the make-up of the black community.
However, a portion of the statement indicated a
cognizance that the negotiations could not confidently
speak for everyone. The white businessmen could more di¬
rectly represent other businessmen and the white community
through the Chamber of Commerce than the black negotiators
could represent the black community. Although the press
release indicated that the black negotiators could repre¬
sent "the principal leadership of the black group," immediate
questioning of the settlement and therefore of the "principal
leadership" arose in the black community.^
The initial statement was much more vague than the
actual agreement reached. It did not mention the target date
of October 15th, or the rehiring of black employees. The
Chamber released a subsequent statement explaining that the
statement assured lunch counter desegregation within the
next six months and they would answer any questions about
the settlement.
But, this reassurance was not sufficient to halt an
uproar in the black community. It only served to intensify
^"Sit-in Terms Under Fire; L. King Out, In Again,
Atlanta Inquirer, March 11, 1961, pp. 1,12.
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it. An initial meeting to explain the settlement was dis¬
solved after much debate. In essence, the black community
was sharply critical of the black leaders as well as the
white leaders.^ The Student-Adult Liason Committee held a
mass meeting on March 10th, in an attempt to clarify the
settlement. The audience at the meeting shouted down the
leaders—adult and student, who pleaded that the agreement
was a "necessary compromise." The student leaders offered
to resign, but the audience would not accept, indicating
that they felt the older blacks were responsible for the
2
compromise settlement. The criticism centered on the fact
that desegregation was not immediate.
When the meeting adjourned, there was no certainty
of what would happen next. The black Voice of Freedom news¬
paper of March 12th, riddled the settlement as a sellout by
the "handkerchief heads."
In short, the Atlanta black bourgeoisie lea¬
dership and their student puppets have once again
supported the forces of reaction which have had
every form of hxjmiliation and cruelty heaped upon
our people; they have allowed themselves to be
used, tricked, and hoodwinked.^
^Ibid., p. 12.
^"Leaders Seek Unity," Atlanta Inquirer, March 18,
1961, p. 1.
^Editorial, Voice of Freedom, March 12, 1961.
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While this group did not itself enjoy great support in the
black community, their sentiments were certainly present at
the meeting that night.
The picketing continued, but no major action resulted
from it. Some of the protest of the settlement centered on
assertions that Atlanta's black leadership pattern had not
changed. However, even though the accession to power of new
elements of the black community was slow, it did occur, and
new alignments were evident in the black community of Atlanta.
Although some members of the coalition were left behind
during the movement, some of them had managed to change
their outlook.
Throughout the spring and sxunmer, some students con¬
tinued to picket while further negotiations were worked out.
Finally, September 27th was the day selected to begin lunch
counter desegregation. Two hundred students were preselected
and tested 177 lunch counters in 75 stores without incident.
1961 was also an election year in Atlanta. Dif¬
ferences among black leadership occurred at this time. The
Negro Voters League endorsed the president of the Chamber of
Commerce for mayor, while the students and younger leaders
(composed primarily of members of the ACCA) endorsed another
candidate. As a result, this created some divisions in the
black community, and a split in the black vote was predicted;
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however, the Negro Voters League carried seventy-three per¬
cent of the black vote to their candidate. Three black
leaders ran for aldermanic positions in the same election.
The Voters League endorsed only one of the blacks, a busi¬
nessman' yet none of the blacks were elected.
The student movement did not end with the lunch
counter settlement. One leader recalled that it lasted
fully another year or so, as long as the original members
of COAHR remained in Atlanta. The sit-ins of 1960 and 1961
stand out, however, as the most significant activity during
this time because they demonstrated the power of the black
community to demand action, thus bring about social change.
Further, they heightened the consciousness of the black com¬
munity beyond the acceptance of tokenism.
An incident in 1963 actually revealed a new awareness
and the new political forces in the black community which had
emerged. Several black families had moved into a white sec¬
tion in southwest Atlanta. To alleviate white tension, the
mayor constructed a barricade in the middle of the integrated
street to separate black and white homes. The enraged black
community compared the barricade to the Berlin Wall and
threatened political retaliation. The mayor called in the
leaders of the Negro Voters League to talk things over. How¬
ever, the League joined COAHR, ACCA, NAACP, and other local
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groups in the All Citizens Conmiittee for Better City Plan¬
ning, and refused to talk to the mayor until he tore down
the barricade. This incident marked the erosion of the old
style of black leadership that began in 1957 and developed
fully in 1961. This erosion was the second important effect
of the Atlanta sit-in movement.
This determination to resist in 1963 was a graphic
example of the end of any monolithic black leadership. It
demonstrated what should have been obvious in 1961: that
the community was factional and very different from the
whites' traditional perception of it. The new president of
the local NAACP said in 1963:
It's a matter now of a new team coming into the
game. We're saying, your team's done fine, but
it's getting tired. New blood is coming in.
We're going to take the ball from here.^
The absence of complete acknowledgement of the truth of
these statements in 1961 emphasized the slowness with
which the older blacks or whites wished to give up the
old coalition, which was essentially a base of power for
blacks, and comfort for the whites. But the courageous use
of new kinds of power and leadership by the students, younger
leaders, a few older leaders, and the aroused black community
^Charles Silberman, Crisis in Black and White (New
York: Random House, Inc., 1964), p. 204.
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left the old alignments far behind. Leadership utilizing
direct action methods and techniques had emerged.
CHAPTER III
ANALYSIS OF LEADERSHIP PATTERNS
The events described in the last chapter show that
changes occurred in the patterns of leadership in the black
community primarily as a result of the civil rights move¬
ment of the early 1960's. These changes do not necessarily
mean that one group of leaders, rather than another, became
more recognized by the black community as their leaders. It
is also possible for the methods and techniques used by a
group of leaders to change as a result of social change.
Although an entirely new group of leaders began to emerge
in the early 1960's, it is worthwhile to note that some of
the older leaders changed their pattern from a conservative
and compromising leadership to that of the direct action
type.
James Coleman theorized that there are generally two
types of assets which may be used by black leaders in order
to effect social change. These ares electoral assets, which
include the vote in elections, black representatives in
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legislature and other political offices; and action assets,
or assets used outside the electoral process, usually in
direct action which presses demands for social change.^
When the white primairy was abolished in Georgia in
1946, thus enabling blacks to vote in all elections, the
coalition of black leaders which formed at this time sought
to organize the newly acquired voting power of the black
community. They worked within the framework of utilizing
their electoral assets to the fullest possible extent.
Since the number of black votes was not sufficient to elect
blacks to legislative and other political offices, the black
leaders influenced the community to try to elect those per¬
sons who might give blacks more rights.
During the early 1960's, the political assets and
resultant patterns of leadership in the black community lay
in the development of extensive devices for exerting demands
on the white coram\anity outside the electoral channels of
politics. According to Coleman, "these resources may take
various forms, ranging from court cases to actions which
violate the law."2 m Atlanta, the resources used included
non-violent action, demonstrations aimed at changing laws
^Coleman, op. cit., pp. 74-5.
2Ibid., p. 76.
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regarded as iniquitous, and demonstrations aimed at exer¬
cising a legally protected right. All of these actions
have the element of collective organization in common and
usually sought to mobilize the community. The explicit aim
was to exert political pressure.
Coleman illustrated a model for direct action lea¬
dership^ which may be applied to this study as the most
probable reason that the pattern of leadership changed in
Atlanta.
Consider a social conflict (desegregation of lunch
counters), with one side the administrative establishment
(the white leadership) and the other a conflict group (the
students). If the conflict group carries out an agressive
act of civil disobedience (sit-ins and demonstrations), then
the administration and behind them the general community will
ordinarily retaliate. The conflict group will in turn be
unified by the agressive response, and respond agressively
in turn and the battle will be on. If the conflict group
exerts enough pressure, they can bring about social change.
Most organizations in the civil rights movement were
born in conflict groups. This gives them certain character¬
istics: their goals are to win in a social conflict; they
^Ibid., pp. 77-8.
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tend to be sustained by conflict; leadership of the organi¬
zation lies with those who are most successful in conflict;
and each organization tends to develop particular styles,
strategies, and arenas of conflict.
These organizations tend to be shaped and structured
by their opposition and by the terns of the dispute. This
is most obvious in the effect of polarization upon the nature
of leadership. As a dispute becomes polarized, those leaders
who urge collaboration and compromise can no longer gain the
support of the community which they lead; those leaders who
more closely follow the wishes of the community, are recog¬
nized as leaders by the community. During the sit-ins, the
older established black leadership realized the great s\am of
momentum gained by the students and saw that the inertia
could not be reversed. As a result, they began to work with
the students, who had the support of the general black com¬
munity, in bringing about social change.
Legal and legislative resources may also serve as
primary mechanisms for change. Generalized, the theory is
that social change can be effectively brought about through
legal statutes aimed at prohibiting certain actions, enforc¬
ing others, or allowing others. In this theory, the court is
the principal arena of social action, any advocate of social
change implements his advocacy by obtaining court rulings.
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A slightly different theory is held by some legislators,
who see the same process, though the principal arena of
social action is the legislature and social change is im¬
plemented by change in the law.^
The theory behind most civil rights activity, as
pointed out above, is that: if the white community's bar¬
riers to opportunity for blacks are removed, blacks will
seize the opportunity and thus overcome the economic, poli¬
tical, or social deficit. The theory of legal and legis¬
lative resources is similar to the other, in that, the
implicit assumption that the principal barrier to social
change is the absence of the appropriate institutional or
legal structure. In part the difference between the theo¬
ries is one of number: "the legal and legislative theories
imply that there exist at least a few men in society who
will pursue the goals relevant to the role. The civil rights
theory implies that a large number of blacks will be able
to adequately fill a new set of roles that is opened to
them.
Electoral assets and legal and legislative assets




subsequent to the sit-in movement. Direct action methods
are still used, but not to the same degree or dependence.
It would be worthwhile to note what changes and gains in
leadership and political power blacks have gained since
1961 in view of these theories.
In 1963, leaders of the black community organized
into a group known as the Siammit Leadership Conference. All
of the leadership came from the group known as the Atlanta
Committee for Cooperative Action. The Negro Voters League
last functioned as a complete group in the 1961 city elec¬
tion and stopped meeting thereafter. In February, 1967, the
membership of the Leadership Conference started community
meetings and reorganized into the Metropolitan Siammit Lea¬
dership Congress. Another group had been organized in the
city known as Young Men on the Go. This group is made up
of former student leaders and other young businessmen. T^hey
have not yet attempted to move out to the forefront and exert
what influence they might have.
There were other groups that engaged in organizing
the black community around issues. These organizations were
the NAACP, the Atlanta Urban League, and the Butler Street
YMCA. These agencies organized communities more on an ad hoc
basis, with the organization going out of existence when the
issue was settled.
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The sixties have also seen the rise of more community
participation in groups trying to be instrimiental in bringing
about change of all types. Economic Opportunity Atlanta
and the Anti-Poverty program were the first major organiza¬
tions to organize community groups. Social organization in
the black community is very important.^ The persons involved
in these groups know the problems of their community and can
make recommendations with the community to help alleviate
some of the existing conditions. Most times, however, their
participation is restricted to an issue in their neighbor¬
hood, rather than an issue with city wide support.
Spontaneous action groups which formed during this
time influenced direct or indirectly the operational poli¬
cies of most community organizations. One executive stated:
Every issue that concerned the city of Atlanta
had poor representation or advocates for the poor
and the reasons they have representation is be¬
cause they have identified the problem and are
demanding that it be solved and for the most part
they are not accepting any solution for solving
the problem, other than their own.
An example of a spontaneous group in action was when the
Board of Education decided to add classrooms to the already
large high school in one black community. The residents
wanted another high school instead. They called a mass
^Ibid., pp. 37-42.
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meeting in the area and drew up a petition to present to the
Board of Education, asking for another school instead of
enlarging the present one. The Board voted to do further
study in the area before anything was done.
The major leadership organizations which were in the
city during the sixties, sometimes worked together for a
common goal, yet at other times they have worked indepen¬
dently of each other.
Black representation in Georgia began in 1962 when an
Atlanta attorney took advantage of reapportionment in the
Georgia Senate, and won a seat. When he took office in 1963,
he was the first black lawmaker since Reconstruction to serve
in Georgia. In 1964, another Atlanta attorney became Geor¬
gia's second black legislator also going to the Senate. When
the House of Representatives was reapportioned in 1965, seven
blacks were elected to serve Georgia that year, and five of
them were from Atlanta. The most widely publicized of these
leaders was a former student leader who became a national
celebrity when the lawmakers refused to seat him because of
his anti-war sentiments.
A real estate man won a position on the Aldermanic
Board in the Atlanta city elections of 1965; and two persons
were elected to the Board of Education.
Significant changes in Atlanta politics occurred in
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1969- The city elections of that year seem to have been
another turning point in the political history of the city.
The third political ward of the city was split in 1968, thus
creating another position on the Aldermanic Board. In the
1969 election, the number of blacks on the Board of Aider-
men increased from one to five, and the number of persons on
the Board of Education rose from two to three. Moreover,
the city elected a young black attorney as vice-mayor.
This election also signified an alteration in the
voting patterns of Atlanta and the emergence of a new "coa¬
lition" of voters. The mayor (Jewish), vice-mayor, and
other blacks elected to office were elected almost by a com¬
pletely different group of voters from that which previously
seemed to control city politics. Whether this nesw "coalition"
stays together and extends its influence or whether different
alliances are forged in the future, the events of 1969 seem
to signal an end of an era in Atlanta politics.
Since 1953, at least, Atlanta’s mayors and other of¬
ficials had been chosen by a coalition composed of virtually
all black voters, most of the middle and upper class whites
who live on the northside of the city and a minority of
whites elsewhere. Aligned against this group were lower and
working class whites, located in the center and on the south-
side of the city. The lower class and working class whites
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always opposed the coalition of blacks and upper class whites
and were always defeated.^
During 1969, almost all blacks and a minority of
whites from all areas of the city, made up the group that
supported the winners above. Thus, upper-middle class
whites and the city's traditional "power structure" (as
defined by Floyd Hunter), lost their former position of
influence in deciding city elections, while blacks greatly
enhanced their influences.
The reasons for this change resulted from a combi¬
nation of factors. One was the breakup of the traditional
coalition between black and white leaders over the question
of which candidate to support. In this election, black voters
were not willing to support the choice of the white business
leaders. Rather than having only the usual choice between
the favorite of upper class whites and another candidate
whose racial views made them anathema, black voters in 1969
had additional alternatives. For the first time, there was
a black candiate, and also a white candidate whose reputation
was more liberal than other white candidates, past or pres¬
ent.
^Jack Walker, "Negro Voting in Atlanta; 1953-1961,"
Phylon; The Atlanta University Review of Race and Culture,
XXIV (Winter, 1963), 379-87.
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A second factor was the continuous growth of black
voting strength in Atlanta. The proportion of blacks among
the city's registered voters increased from about twenty-
nine percent in 1961 to forty-one percent in 1969. This
growth of black voting strength was due both to the increase
in the proportion of blacks in the total population, which
rose from thirty-eight percent in 1960 to forty-nine per¬
cent in 1969, and to an increase in the proportion of eli¬
gible blacks who are registered to vote.^
As the sixties progressed, leadership in the black
community also moved forward, changing its methods as social
change occurred in an effort to bring about further social
change. The sit-in movement provided the force which was
necessary for the black leadership to realize that their
function was not to lead each other, but rather, the commu¬
nity of which they are an integral part.
The black community itself is responsible for many
of the changes in the patterns of leadership which occurred.
Prior to the sitrins, the white leadership structure dic¬
tated who the black leaders were. As the black community
became increasingly aware of the resources available to them
to bring about social change, they began to designate who
^Charles S. Rooks, The Atlanta Election of 1969
(Atlanta: Voter Education Project, Inc., 1970), p. 3.
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they wished to represent them. As a result the white com¬
munity has finally become knowledgeable of the many diver¬
gences of leadership that have evolved during the 1960's.
During the early sixties, direct action methods
were the only means by which the deficit in black freedom
of action could be reduced. Compromising and negotiating
were utilized to the fullest extent, yet only through per¬
sistently exerting pressure on the white power structure,
could social change come about. However, black political
power and efficacy through usual channels of democratic
politics such as voting has increased. In turn, the commu¬
nity was able to elect their leaders to positions in the
legislature^and local political offices; and these positions
can constitute real positions of power and leadership.
CHAPTER IV
CONCLUSION
The purpose of this study was to determine whether
or not there were any changes in the patterns of leadership
in the black community of Atlanta, Georgia, during the
1960's. It was done primarily through a socio-historical
analysis of events, conflicts, and crises which occurred
during this time and which were significant to the black
community.
The study revealed that changes in the patterns of
leadership did occur during this period. The Atlanta civil
rights movement of 1960 and 1961 initiated many changes in
the social and political life of the city, and was the pri¬
mary reason for the changing black leadership patterns.
Several siib-hypotheses were examined in this study.
These hypotheses stated that leadership in the black com¬
munity: (1) may change its pattern as a result of social
change; (2) is more a function of the pecularities of the
situation rather than the kind of reputation one has; (3) is
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most demanding, requiring continuous presence, personal
participation, dialogue, and face-to-face interaction rather
than indirect communication and acting through representa¬
tives; (4) is based more on immediate accomplishments than
past performances; and (5) is distributed among people of
a wide variety of social and economic circxamstances and is
not limited to a prestigious elite of high socio-economic
status.
It was shown that prior to 1960, black leadership
consisted of one group of leaders who negotiated and com¬
promised with the major white leaders of the city, in an
effort to obtain rights for the black community. This lea¬
dership pattern was effective only to the extent that the
leaders were successful in changing a few minor social
policies, but nothing major in benefiting the black commu¬
nity.
The sit-ins that occurred during 1960 and 1961 were
successful in bringing about a change in social policy by
desegregating the lunch counters and other public facilities
in the city, in a much shorter period of time than one group
could effect in ten years. The various situations and events
involved the reputed black leaders, students, and an emerg¬
ing younger leadership. The students can not be properly
termed as leaders in the black community, however, they were
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instrumental as being an important source of force in the
community.
The new patterns of leadership which emerged as a
result of this movement, took several years to actually
become visible. The students and younger leadership groups
did not arrogantly surplant the older black leaders over¬
night. The process of change witnessed intermediate periods
of cooperation and compromise with the white community as
well as the students; and then culminated, not in a new mono¬
lithic black leadership with the students and younger lea¬
dership on top, but rather, in a diverse political community
with militant, conservative, and intermediate factions.
Because of this new make-up of black leadership, it
can be seen that leadership in the black community is now
more a function of the pecularities of the situation, rather
than the kind of reputation one has. During the sit-ins and
for some time after, direct-action techniques and resources
were utilized to a great extent by black leaders. As the
sixties progressed, more legal and legislative and electoral
resources have become available to black leaders. A rise in
community participation groups has also occurred and these
persons have tried to bring about change of all types in
their own communities. Major black organizations have been
instrumental in organizing these groups. Spontaneous action
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groups also form for the purpose of dealing with specific
problems in the community and city. After the issue has
been resolved, these groups usually dissolve.
The diversity in leadership was found to be neces¬
sary in order to utilize both direct-action resources and
electoral resources. One group of leaders cannot effect¬
ively serve the community. Personal interaction is often
more effective than acting through representatives. This
does not mean that representation is not important. It has
been shown that blacks are now in positions of real power
in representative positions, both on the city and state
levels. However, without the support of the black community,
this representation would not be possible. The election of
black representatives to public office has revealed a new
independence among blacks in using their voting power to
their best advantage rather than accepting what the white
leadership and community has to offer.
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